With the Stabilization Plan, a very important change of strategy came about in Spanish economic policy, that of opening the frontiers to the entry of goods and foreign capital.

This commercial opening, together with the low competitiveness of the Spanish economy and the great need for capital goods and raw materials, produced a notable chronic deficit in the balance of trade, which was financed by: entry of capital into Spain through the tourist boom during the 1960s; remittances sent home by Spanish workers who had emigrated to the more developed European countries, and foreign investment. This new model produced high growth in production and national income.

Nevertheless, the growth of this period was very unstable. The stages of expansion were immediately followed by periods of recession. When production increased quickly, it generated a deficit in the balance of payments which, given the regime of fixed interest rates, produced a progressive loss of capital reserves, thereby necessitating the adoption of restrictive economic policy measures. The consequent recession reestablished a trade balance and these economic measures were repressed; the cycle began all over again. The economic policy of this period was a clear example of a "stop-and-go" policy.

Although the new focus of economic policy initially brought about an appreciable opening to other countries, it did by no means represent a total opening, nor a total liberalization of the economy since quantitative restrictions on imports, protecting national industry against foreign competition, proliferated. Nor was the economy made more flexible domestically, which meant that market forces were not responsible for the distribution of resources. Subsidies to businesses, the privileged circuits of financing for determined sectors, administrative prices, the lack of competition in the financial system, etc. were frequent. In short, a paternalistic and protective concept of the State was maintained, which, after 1964, shaped the development plans conceived by indicative planning theory in Spain.

The monetary policy applied during the 1960s was characterized by the following aspects:

Firstly, it was a passive monetary policy in that until 1971 it did not have the necessary instruments to be able to control monetary aggregates.

Secondly, it was a policy of cheap money, in the sense that, owing to the possibility of automatically discounting the Public Debt in the Bank of Spain, situations of money stringency could not be produced.

And thirdly, it was a policy which permitted the financing of economic development needs.

This policy generated a more intensive use of capital than would have been expected by the physical workcapital resources of the country. This fact, together with the abundant work force, evern larger due to the loss of jobs in agriculture as a result of industrialization, and the incorporation of women into the workplace, facilitated by the growth of the tertiary sector, meant that, in spite of strong economic growth, full employment was not achieved, resulting in emigration during the 1960s.

Industry was based heavily on the industrial sector, steel and shipbuilding, as well as the traditional textiles and footwear. Standard technology industry was the norm, and its competitiveness was based on low production costs, which, with regards to work, meant cheap unskilled labour and little industrial strife, and capital based upon a cheap money monetary system.